One of the most novel and active debates in contemporary philosophy of perception concerns the admissibility/inadmissibility of higher-level properties in visual perception. The debate is usually structured on the basis of a tension between two opposing camps. On the one hand, we have conservative theories according to which only lower-level properties can be visually perceived and determine the phenomenal character of an experience. For example, in our visual experiences, only properties such as color, shape, texture, motion, or spatial location would be perceptually admissible. On the other hand, there are liberal theories for which we would be capable of perceiving higher-level properties, for example, properties of natural kinds (e.g., being a pine tree or being a tomato) or facial properties that express emotions. This philosophical research project aims precisely to answer central questions in this debate by implementing a methodology for the conceptual/semantic analysis of arguments characteristic of post-analytic philosophy and by exhaustively reviewing relevant empirical evidence. Particular emphasis will be placed on the evaluation of phenomenal contrast arguments, that is, arguments based on situations in which two subjects (or the same subject at different times) may have perceptual experiences with different phenomenology as a result of differences in background cognitive states or other kinds of skills grounded in practice or experience.
The overall motivation or purpose of the project is to evaluate what kinds of properties are admissible in visual perception (lower-level properties and/or higher-level properties) and to determine the role that cognition and perceptual learning models play in this context. The project is structured as a three-stage (three-year) work plan associated with objectives determined by specific hypotheses:
(i) The general objective of the first stage is to determine criteria that allow us to reasonably distinguish between perceptual processing (perception) and cognitive processing (cognition), and to evaluate the relationship between higher-level properties and lower-level properties in order to differentiate them. Some of the preliminary hypotheses in this stage are that the irresistibility of processing (automatic and immediate) of a stimulus constitutes a minimum criterion for perceptual processing and that the relationship between higher- and lower-level properties is one of asymmetric causal and phenomenological dependence.
(ii) The general objective of the second stage is to determine the role that cognition plays in this debate about the admissibility of higher- and lower-level properties in perception. One of the central hypotheses to be addressed in this context is that the role of cognition is exclusively indirect, either pre-perceptual in the selection of one stimulus over another or post-perceptual in activating specific attentional selection patterns that trigger phenomenal alterations.
(iii) The third stage has the general objective of evaluating the plausibility of a perceptual learning model as an alternative to cognitive models in explaining phenomenal contrasts. Among the hypotheses to be considered are the viability of long-term alterations in perceptual processing as a result of practice or experience and the general viability of models based on attentional selection patterns of stimulus features where cognition does not play a direct role.
The project seeks to support, as a thesis, a heterogeneous "third way," distinct from the theories traditionally proposed by liberals and conservatives regarding the admissibility of properties in perception. It will be argued that, except for specific cases of properties that do possess a determining biological and social relevance, the liberal thesis according to which a wide range of higher-level properties are admissible in perception lacks support. Furthermore, as a deflationary alternative, it will be pointed out that attentional models of perceptual learning constitute the best explanation for cases of phenomenal alterations in perception and that these models do not require direct intervention of cognition in perceptual processing.
El proyecto contempla incorporar a asistentes de investigación y a tesistas de posgrado que cursen sus estudios en la UAH y trabajen sobre temas vinculados con el proyecto. Revisa esta página y nuestras redes sociales para enterarte de las convocatorias futuras.